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Abstract
We consider the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem in a dynamic,
stochastic environment when the government cannot change the tax rule as
uncertainty resolves. Due to such a stationarity constraint, our taxation prob-
lem is reduced to a static one over an expanded type space that incorporates
type evolution. We strengthen the argument in the static model that the zero
top marginal tax rate result is of little practical importance because it only
applies to the top of the expanded type space. If the maximal type increases
over time, the person with top ability in any period but the last has a positive
marginal tax rate.
JEL classification: H21
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1 Introduction
Since theNewDynamic Public Financewas inaugurated, progress has beenmade
in clarifying what the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax looks like. This
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agenda aims to extend the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), who studies optimal
income taxation in a static environment, to dynamic, stochastic environments.1
Dynamic tax rules are in eect dynamic contracts because taxpayers have pri-
vate information about their labor productivity, so the optimal dynamic income
tax rule is generally complicated: it is non-stationary and depends on the entire
history of income declared for any taxpayer. However, it is questionable whether
governments can implement such complex tax rules becausemaking tax rules time-
dependent and tracking histories of income would entail large administrative and
compliance costs. Indeed, neither of our governments (i.e., the US and Japanese
governments) is tracking income histories for labor income taxation.
In view of this observation, we contribute to the New Dynamic Public Finance
literature by considering optimal dynamic income taxation when the government
faces a stationarity constraint that the tax rule cannot be changed over time. That
is, the government can use only stationary tax rules. Moreover, stationarity of
tax rule implies that the tax cannot depend on histories of income. Indeed, the
government using a stationary tax rule can look at only current incomes, just as it
can only look at current incomes in the initial period. Naturally, we also assume
that the government makes a full commitment to its (stationary) tax rule. That is,
once the tax rule is determined in the initial period, the government cannot switch
to another stationary tax rule afterwards. We are assuming that such commitment
is not only possible, but perhaps unavoidable, due to political deadlock over the
issue of tax policy, as in the US right now.2 Thus, we may interpret our planner’s
problem on a politician’s short time-scale. Although our assumptions might be
extreme, we believe that it is important and useful to have a sense about what
the optimal dynamic income tax looks like when the set of tax rules is limited to
ones that are feasible in practice. Moreover, as we shall discuss below, stationarity
brings with it tractability.
We consider a finite horizon discrete time model in which the government
would like to maximize the equal-weight utilitarian social welfare function. Our
economy is heterogeneous, as we begin with a non-trivial exogenous type dis-
1See Kocherlakota (2010) for an overview of this literature.
2Indeed, the US government has not changed its income tax system in a major way since 1986.
The Japanese government is more flexible, but it has not changed its income tax system in a major
way since 2007. Therefore, once the tax systems are fixed, they persist for some time.
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tribution where type here is people’s earning ability.3 People’s type is subject to
stochastic shocks in each period. We focus on idiosyncratic first-order Markov
shocks that are i.i.d. among people. Regarding intertemporal resource alloca-
tion, we assume that the government can save or borrow from an outside party.
However, we assume that agents cannot save or borrow. We shall discuss this
assumption further below.
Although the analytical characterizations and even numerical analysis of the
optimal dynamic tax systemare dicult in general, we can analytically characterize
the optimal tax system because our problem can be reduced to a static one owing to
the stationarity of the tax rule.4 Specifically, this is because the tax rule depends on
only the current income under the stationarity constraint and individual saving or
borrowing is not allowed, so we can regard an agent living for T periods, who has
a time-separable preference, as distinct agents in each period and for each shock
by appealing to the law of large numbers. Moreover, because the government can
save or borrow, the law of large numbers also implies a single aggregate resource
constraint. We can then directly apply the arguments for static models to our
model.
A famous result in static optimal income taxation is that the top marginal tax
rate is zero. That is, the top earner’s marginal tax rate is zero. However, we cast
doubt on its policy relevance. In our dynamic stochastic economy, the support of
types will move over time, and a direct application of the static arguments implies
that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of the expanded type space, or the union
of supports over time. As a result, we can consider a structure of type evolution
such that the zero top marginal tax result does not apply for periods before the last
period, and that the standard result applies at the last period. It has been argued
in static models that the zero top marginal tax rate result is not important because
the fraction of people who face a zero marginal tax rate is small, and our result
strengthens this. Indeed, if the time horizon is large, it is not really relevant.
The policy relevance of the zero top marginal tax rate result has also been
3If we do not fix the initial type distribution, the model has identical agents facing uncertainty,
which is like a macro model. However, as long as we consider the equal-weight utilitarian social
welfare function, the distinction is not essential for the optimal tax rule as Farhi andWerning (2013)
illustrate.
4Naturally, gaining tractability in this waywidens the analytical insights about optimal dynamic
income taxationwe could derive. For example, if we assumed quasi-linear utility, we could conduct
comparative static analysis as in Weymark (1987).
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questioned from other perspectives. Diamond (1998) considers unbounded skill
distributions and shows that the asymptotic marginal tax rate is generally nonzero
(see also Diamond and Saez, 2011). Tuomala (1990, chapter 9) considers uncer-
tainties in income and type, respectively, and examines how the insurance motive
aects the optimal income tax. He numerically shows that, in either case, the
marginal tax rate is increasing in income up to the 99th percentile of the income
distribution. In their arguments, the zero top marginal tax result does not hold. In
our model, on the other hand, it does hold but only at the top of the expanded type
space.
The stationarity constraint has anon-negligible impact on equilibriumoutcomes
of new dynamic public finance models. Battaglini and Coate (2008), who consider
history-dependent non-stationary tax rules, show that the marginal tax rate is
zero if an agent is currently, or has at some point been, the top earner. Thus, an
individual who is the top earner in all periods faces a zero marginal tax rate in
every period. Evidently, their tax rule takes full advantage of the fact that it can be
history-dependent and non-stationary. In our model, as we have stated, such an
individual faces a zero marginal tax rate only in the terminal period. Moreover,
we observe that the structure of the stochastic shock can also have a non-negligible
impact. Because Battaglini and Coate (2008) consider a two-state Markov process,
the support of types is fixed over time. Thus, their result implies that the fraction
of people whose allocation is distorted vanishes as the time horizon increases. On
the other hand, in our model, the support of types generally moves over time, and
all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.
Regarding the past literature that is relevant to ourwork, one of themost general
treatments of optimal nonlinear income taxation in a dynamic, stochastic economy
is Kocherlakota (2005). In his model, both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
are present, and no restriction is imposed on the processes of shocks. Albanesi
and Sleet (2006) consider optimal taxation in a dynamic stochastic economy with
i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks. They show that the constrained-ecient allocation can
be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with an indirect mechanism that
depends on only current wealth and current labor income. Battaglini and Coate
(2008), as we have already mentioned, consider a dynamic stochastic economy
where idiosyncratic shocks evolve as a two-state Markov process. Although the
stochastic structure is simplified, they address the eects of people’s risk attitude
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and the time-consistency of the optimal tax rule.5
There has been some work that shares our motivation and studies tax rules that
are more realistic than fully optimal rules in dynamic economies. It has been found
that simple tax rules can achieve sizable welfare gains. Weinzierl (2011) considers
history-independent non-stationary tax rules, which he calls age-dependent tax
rules, in dynamic economies.6 He shows that, if an agent is the top earner in every
period, she faces no distortion in every period. On the contrary, in our stationary
case, the top of the expanded type space where no distortion arises is generally not
attained in any period except the last, even if an agent is always the top earner.
Golosov et al. (2013) study a realistic pension system in which the income tax is
history-independent and retirement benefits are inspired by the actual US system.
Farhi and Werning (2013) consider a life cycle model with idiosyncratic shocks
that evolve as a Markov process, and study history-independent non-stationary
tax rules. Compared to the work above, we consider an even simpler case where
the tax is stationary.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we state the basic
structure of the model, present our problem, and characterize the second-best tax
rule. Section 3 contains our conclusions and discusses subjects for future research.
Proofs omitted from the main text are provided in an Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a finite horizon model with a unit mass of agents. The economy
lasts for T+1 periods. In period 0, each agent is endowedwith typew0 2 W0  R++,
distributed with density function f 0. We view our model as a heterogeneous
economywhere the type distribution is f 0. However, there are idiosyncratic shocks
to the agents’ types in the subsequentperiods. Thedrawof the shock is independent
over agents. We assume that the type wt follows a first-order Markov process with
conditional density f t(wt+1 jwt). Let Wt = wt : 9wt 1 2 Wt 1; f t(wt jwt 1) > 0	. Wt is
the type space in period t. We assume that Wt is a non-degenerate closed interval
in R++. For later use, we also define the expanded type spaceW =
ST
t=0Wt. This is
5In a two-period deterministic environment, Berliant and Ledyard (2014) study a history-
dependent non-stationary tax rule while addressing time-consistency.
6Gaube (2010) also discusses age-dependent tax rules. Because his main interest lies in the
time-consistency of tax rules, he focuses on a two-period model.
5
also assumed to be a non-degenerate closed interval.
The agents supply labor and consume the good produced under constant re-
turns to scale in each period. In our model, type represents the earning ability of
agents. That is, if the labor supply of agent w is `, his gross income is given by
y = w`. As is usual in optimal taxation models, the agents face a trade-o between
consumption and leisure. The utility function is
U

fct; `tgTt=0

=
TX
t=0
tu(ct; `t) (1)
where `t 2 [0; 1] is labor in period t, ct is consumption in period t, and  > 0 is the
discount factor. We assume that u(c; `) is separable in c and `:
u(c; `) =  c(c)    `(`); (2)
where c and ` are strictly increasing and twice continuously dierentiable. More-
over,  c and   ` are concave where at least one of them is strictly so.7
The government would like to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we
consider the following utilitarian social welfare function:
SW =
Z
W0
E
h
U

fct; yt=wtgTt=0
 w0i f 0(w0)dw0: (3)
where the conditional expectation is taken with respect to
f t(wt jw0) =
Z
Wt 1
f t(wt jwt 1) f t 1(wt 1 jwt 2)    f 1(w1 jw0)dwt 1dwt 2   dw1
for each t. Under the assumptions imposed on the one-period utility function, it
follows that redistribution is desirable under the utilitarian welfare function with,
if necessary, a twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and strictly concave
transformation of the one-period utility function (Hellwig, 2007, Corollary 3.2).8
7These are sucient for u to be strictly quasi-concave.
8For general utility functions, we need the single-crossing propertywhich requires that @u(c;y=w)=@cj@u(c;y=w)=@yj
be increasing in w. For our separable utility function, we have
d
dw
@u(c; y=w)=@c
j@u(c; y=w)=@yj =
 0c(c) 0`(y=w) +  
0
c(c) 00` (y=w)y=w
 0`(y=w)
2 > 0; (4)
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The plannerwould like to carry out redistribution through lump-sum income taxes,
but he cannot observe the agents’ types. Thus, the government needs to design a
mechanism that makes the agents reveal their true types (i.e., it needs to design an
incentive compatible (IC) mechanism).
Specifically, we consider a direct mechanism in which agents report their types,
and the labor income yt() and consumption ct() are specified for each report in each
period. In the following, we assume that people cannot save or borrow, and hence
focus on labor income taxation (i.e., capital income taxation is excluded). Although
the no saving assumption is strong for dynamic models, it is not uncommon in the
NDPF literature.9 Amodel that is consistent with this assumption is obtained from
primitives when we assume quasi-linear utility and the discount and interest rates
coincide. In this case, if we tax savings at all, nobody saves because people are
indierent about when to consume, and there is no revenue from taxing savings.
The tax thenbecomes a labor income tax. Aquasi-linearutility function is consistent
with the other assumptions we shall use.
Although the allocation rule could depend on histories of types in general, one
important consequence of excluding saving is that any incentive compatible mech-
anism is history independent. To see this, suppose that allocation rule
 
yt(); ct()Tt=0
is incentive compatible. Then, in the last period,
8wT 2 WT;u
 
cT(wT);
yT(wT)
wT
!
 u
 
cT(wˆT);
yT(wˆT)
wT
!
for all wˆT 2 WT; (5)
whereWt is the set of feasible histories up to period t. That is,
Wt =

(w0;w1; :::;wt) : w0 2 W0; f s(ws jws 1) > 0 for all s = 1; 2; :::; t	 : (6)
However, because the IC condition (5) depends on only wT, (cT(); yT()) is history-
independent. Next, the IC constraint in period T   1 is
8wT 1 2 WT 1; u
 
cT 1(wT 1);
yT 1(wT 1)
wT 1
!
+ E
"
u
 
cT(wT);
yT(wT)
wT
!
jwT 1
#
because  0c > 0;  0` > 0;  
00
c  0;  00`  0, and  00c = 0 )  00` > 0. A twice continuously dieren-
tiable, increasing, and strictly concave transformation of u becomes necessary for the desirability of
redistribution when  c is not strictly concave.
9For example, Battaglini and Coate (2008) and Weinzierl (2011) make this assumption.
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 u
 
cT 1(wˆT 1);
yT 1(wˆT 1)
wT 1
!
+E
"
u
 
cT(wˆT 1;wT);
yT(wˆT 1;wT)
wT
!
jwT 1
#
for all wˆT 1 2 WT 1:
(7)
However, because (cT(); yT()) is history-independent, (7) reduces to
8wT 1 2 WT 1;u
 
cT 1(wT 1);
yT 1(wT 1)
wT 1
!
 u
 
cT 1(wˆT 1);
yT 1(wˆT 1)
wT 1
!
for all wˆT 1 2 WT 1:
(8)
Thus, (cT 1(); yT 1()) is history-independent.10 Continuing in this way, we induce
that (ct(); yt()) is history-independent for all t. Hence, in the following, we may
focus on history-independent allocation rules. Moreover, because we will use
optimal control theory to solve for the second-best allocation rule, defined below,
we assume that allocation rules are piecewise continuously dierentiable.
Given allocation rule
 
yt(); ct()Tt=0, the income tax rule (t())Tt=0, which is an indi-
rectmechanismmapping declared labor incomes to taxes, is constructed. However,
the planner faces a stationarity constraint for (t())Tt=0. That is, t() = () for all t
and, as a consequence, () is independent of history. Let Y = STt=0 yt(Wt) where
yt(Wt) is the range of yt. The income tax rule is then given by map  : Y ! R.
Wewould like to consider stationary allocation rules for analytical convenience.
To see under what environment a stationary  implies a stationary allocation rule,
note that the IC conditions in terms of  must hold for any deviations in a single
domain because the domain of  is time-independent. Specifically, the IC constraint
is that, for any t,
8w 2 Wt; u
 
yt(w)   (yt(w)); yt(w)w
!
 u
 
y0   (y0); y
0
w
!
for all y0 2 Y: (9)
Thus, in terms of allocation rule, we have
8w 2 Wt; u
 
ct(w);
yt(w)
w
!
 u
 
cs(w0);
ys(w0)
w
!
for all w0 2 Ws and s: (10)
We then have the following result.
10Although (7) is an ex post condition, it follows that it is equivalent to ex ante IC constraints up
to measure zero sets (Fernandes and Phelan, 2000).
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Lemma 1. Suppose that  0`(`)` is strictly increasing in `. Let
 
yt(); ct()Tt=0 be history-
independent and incentive compatible. Then, there exist maps y : W ! R and c : W ! R
such that yt = y and ct = c almost everywhere on Wt for all t.
Proof. See Appendix. 
We henceforth assume that  0`(`)` is strictly increasing in `. For instance, this
condition holds if  `(`) = ` for   1. Therefore, we focus on allocation rules
described by function (y; c) : W ! R2 such that the allocation rule in period t is the
restriction of (y; c) toWt.11 By (10), the IC constraint is then
8w 2 W; u
 
y(w)
w
; c(w)
!
 u
 
y(w0)
w
; c(w0)
!
for all w0 2 W: (IC)
In addition to the IC constraints, the government faces a resource constraint:
it needs to finance G in units of consumption good through the tax. This revenue
could be used for a public good that is fixed in quantity (and thus in cost) or the
public good could enter utility as an additively separable term. We assume that
the government can borrow or save at rate . Because the income tax collected
from agent reporting w is (w) = y(w)   c(w), the government faces the following
resource constraint (RC):
G  E
2666664 TX
t=0
t
 
y(wt)   c(wt)3777775 : (RC)
Then, the planner’s problem is given by
max
c();y()
Z
W0
E
2666664 TX
t=0
tu
 
c(wt);
y(wt)
wt
! w03777775 f 0(w0)dw0
s.t. (RC) and (IC).
(11)
We solve for the second-best allocation rule by using optimal control theory as
in Hellwig (2007). For reference, the first-best allocation rule maximizes the utili-
tarian welfare function subject to the resource constraint only, assuming that the
government knows the type of each agent at each time.
11We note that the government is aware of the stationarity constraint, so once it chooses its
allocation rule, it knows the rule cannot be changed, and accounts for this when choosing the rule.
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Beforeproceeding, let us summarize the regularity conditionswehave imposed:
Assumption 1 (Regularity conditions).
1. The type follows a first-order Markov process with conditional density f t(wt+1 jwt)
such that Wt and W are non-degenerate closed intervals in R++;
2. u(c; `) is separable in c and ` as u(c; `) =  c(c)    `(`) where  c and  ` are strictly
increasing and twice continuously dierentiable;  c and   ` are concave where at
least one of them is strictly so. Moreover,  0`(`)` is strictly increasing in `.
Here is the key idea of our work. When we solve the problem (11), we exploit
the fact that our mechanism is time-invariant and does not depend on history,
and we consider a time-separable utility function and the utilitarian social welfare
function. Therefore, the problem can be reduced to a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is expanded to
PT
t=0 
t. That is, each person in each period is
considered to be a dierent person in the static model, though themass of agents in
period t is compressed to t owing to the planner’s discounting. Utilitarianismwith
the time-separable utility gives us the equivalence.12 Then, we take the standard
approach for static optimal income taxation problems to solve the problem (11).13
That is, we consider a relaxed problem in which the IC constraints are replaced
with weaker conditions that address only downward deviations and invoke the
fact that a solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the original problem.
Let w = minW and w = maxW (thus, W = [w;w]). The main properties of the
planner’s allocation rule are then summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that people cannot save or borrow.
Then, 0(y(w)) = 0 and if y(w) is strictly increasing at w = w, 0(y(w)) = 0. Moreover, if
y(w) > 0, then 0(y(w)) 2 (0; 1) for any w 2 (w;w).
Proof. See Appendix. 
The proposition states that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of W and if
income is strictly increasing at the bottom of W, the marginal tax rate is also zero
12The properties of the second-best tax rules we derive is robust, while the desirability of redis-
tribution is unaected, to a time-independent, twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and
strictly concave transformation of instantaneous utilities.
13Because our problem is static, the taxation principle (Hammond, 1979) implies that characteriz-
ing the direct mechanism (y; c) is equivalent to designing a tax rule  and letting each agent choose
his income yt and consumption ct = yt   (yt).
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there. On the other hand, if income is positive, the marginal tax rate is more than 0
but less then 1 in the interior ofW. One remark is that this result also holds in more
general environments, as long as the allocation rule is stationary. In particular, it
is not necessary that the utility function is separable and the shock is Markovian.
The shock simply has to be i.i.d. across agents.
Suppose that y(w) is strictly increasing at w. By Proposition 1, as long as
everyone works so that y(w) > 0 for all w 2 W, the marginal tax rate is zero only
at the top and bottom of the expanded type space W. Thus, being the top earner
in each period generally does not imply that his marginal tax rate is zero in every
period. In particular, suppose that the type space monotonically expands over
time (or maxWt increases and minWt decreases over time). For example, suppose
T = 2;W0 = [3; 4], and wt+1 = wt+ swhere s is uniformly distributed over [ 1; 1] for
t  0. In that case, we have W1 = [2; 5] and W2 = [1; 6]. Then, no one’s marginal tax
rate is zero in the first T periods nor the last period except when the type of an individual
reaches w = maxW or w = minW in the last period. That is, the zero top marginal
rate result does not apply for periods before time T, and that the standard result
applies at time T. If T is large, this never really happens.
It is useful to compare our result with history-independent non-stationary tax
studied byWeinzierl (2011). Under no individual saving or borrowing, it is shown
that, if an agent is the top earner in every period, then he faces a zero marginal tax
rate in every period. This generally does not hold for our stationary case because
maxW is not necessarily attained in every period even if an agent is the top earner
in every period.14
Moreover, it would be worth pointing out that the results above are in sharp
contrast with those of Battaglini and Coate (2008) in which the shock follows a
Markov chain over two states (high and low). Under their tax rule, the allocation
is distorted only when people’s type is currently and has always been low. That is,
the allocations of agents who are currently, or have at some point been, high types
are first-best. Therefore, the fraction of people whose allocations are distorted is
decreasing over time whereas, in our model, the allocation is distorted anywhere
in the interior of W as long as income is positive.15 Their results crucially depend
14Although the result is shown for the deterministic case, Weinzierl (2011) shows that making the
wagepath stochastic does not change the qualitative results as long as the tax is history-independent.
See the technical appendix of that paper.
15Whether the allocation is distorted at the top depends on the utility function. For example, if
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on the following facts: the support of types is discrete and fixed over time, and the
tax rule can depend on history.16 In our model, the support of types is continuous
and generally changes over time, and the tax rule can depend on only the current
income. As a result, all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any
period.
3 Conclusion
We consider the optimal dynamic income taxation problem faced by a gov-
ernment that cannot change the tax rule over time. Because of the stationarity
constraint, we could reduce our problem to a static one and analytically charac-
terize the second-best tax rule. We argued that the zero top marginal tax result is
of little importance in practice because it only applies to the top of expanded type
space that incorporates type evolution. For example, if we consider type spaces
that monotonically expand over time, we ensure a positive marginal tax rate for
the top type except for the last period.17
Regarding the stationarity of the tax rule, wehavemade an extreme assumption:
the government cannot make its tax rule time-dependent and thus its tax rates
cannot be history-dependent at all. It might be more realistic to consider the
situation in which the government can make its tax rule time-dependent or look at
past histories at some cost.
Moreover, because we considered idiosyncratic shocks that are i.i.d. among
agents, we could obtain a single resource constraint by invoking the law of large
numbers. Besides the stationarity of the tax rule, this was also crucial for our
results. In fact, if the agents face the common aggregate shocks, their types are
correlated with each other, and the analytical approach of this paper will fail to
apply. These should be subjects of future research.
Finally, although we characterized an optimal tax rule, we did not address its
existence. This can probably be proved using the results of Berliant and Page (2001)
for static optimal income taxes.
the utility function is quasi-linear, the allocation is first-best at the top.
16Note that they also do not allow for saving or borrowing.
17In this paper, we consider a finite-horizon model. Technically speaking, we use optimal control
theory, so by replacing terminal conditions with transversality conditions, we would be able to
extend Proposition 1 to an infinite-horizon model.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that the interior ofWt\Ws is not empty for some t; s  0
with t , s.18 Let w be an interior point ofWt \Ws. Then, by (10),
u
 
ct(w);
yt(w)
w
!
= u
 
cs(w);
ys(w)
w
!
: (12)
Moreover, we will show that
du

ct(w);
yt(w)
w0

dw0

w0=w
=
du

cs(w);
ys(w)
w0

dw0

w0=w
: (13)
To see this, note that
du

ct(w0);
yt(w0)
w0

dw0

w0=w
=
du

ct(w);
yt(w)
w0

dw0

w0=w
+
du

ct(w0);
yt(w0)
w

dw0

w0=w
=
du

ct(w);
yt(w)
w0

dw0

w0=w
;
(14)
because
du

ct(w0);
yt(w
0)
w

dw0

w0=w
= 0 by the IC constraint. Suppose (13) does not hold.
Then,
du

ct(w0);
yt(w0)
w0

dw0

w0=w
,
du

cs(w);
ys(w)
w0

dw0

w0=w
: (15)
Then, because (12) holds andw is in the interior ofWt\Ws, we can takew0 2 Wt\Ws
such that
u
 
cs(w);
ys(w)
w0
!
> u
 
ct(w0);
yt(w0)
w0
!
: (16)
However, because w0 2 Wt \ Ws  Wt and w 2 Wt \ Ws  Ws, (yt(); ct()) is not
incentive compatible by (10).
Thus, we have
 0`
 
yt(w)
w
!
yt(w)
w
=  0`
 
ys(w)
w
!
ys(w)
w
: (17)
Hence, we have yt(w) = ys(w) if  0`(`)` is strictly increasing in `. Note that, if
yt(w) = ys(w), we must have ct(w) = cs(w) by the stationarity of . 
18BecauseW =
ST
t=0Wt is assumed to be a closed interval, Wt \Ws = ; for any t; s  0 with t , s
is not allowed. If the interior of Wt \Ws is empty for any t; s  0 with t , s, then we immediately
attain the result.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We show that, due to the stationarity constraint, our problem
canbe reduced to a static problemand then invoke the results ofHellwig (2007)who
analyzes a static optimal taxation problem under the utilitarian welfare function.
As in Hellwig (2007), we consider a relaxed problem by replacing the IC constraint
with a weaker condition that is called the downward IC constraint:
8w 2 W; u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
 u
 
c(w0);
y(w0)
w
!
for all w0 2 fw˜ 2 W : w˜  wg : (IC0)
Thus, the downward IC constraint takes care of only downward deviations. By
Lemma 6.2 of Hellwig (2007), (y(); c()) with nondecreasing c() satisfies (IC0) if and
only if du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw  du(c(w);y(w)=w
0)
dw0 jw0=w for all w 2 W. Thus, when we solve the
problem, we impose the constraints that c(w) is nondecreasing and du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw 
du(c(w);y(w)=w0)
dw0 jw0=w onW instead of the downward IC constraint.
Next, we rewrite the welfare function asZ
W0
E
2666664 TX
t=0
tu
 
c(wt);
y(wt)
wt
! w03777775 f 0(w0)dw0 = TX
t=0
t
Z
Wt
u
 
c(wt);
y(wt)
wt
!
f t(wt)dwt
where f t(wt) =
R
Wt 1 f
t(wt jwt 1) f t 1(wt 1 jwt 2)    f 0(w0)dwt 1dwt 2   dw0. Let f t be
an extension of f t to W (i.e., f t(w) = f t(w) on Wt and f t(w) = 0 on W nWt). Then,
the above expression reduces toZ
W
u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
g(w)dw (18)
where g(w)  PTt=0 t f t(w). Likewise, the resource constraint is reduced to
G 
Z
W
 
y(w)   c(w) g(w)dw: (19)
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Therefore, our relaxed problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W
u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
g(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W
 
y(w)   c(w) g(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw  du(c(w);y(w)=w
0)
dw0 jw0=w on W:
(20)
On the other hand, Hellwig (2007) considers a standard static optimal taxation
problem. Specifically, in our notation, his problem is written as
max
x(  )
Z
W0
u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
f 0(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W0
 
y(w)   c(w) f 0(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw  du(c(w);y(w)=w
0)
dw0 jw0=w on W0:
(21)
Hence, we can see that our problem can be viewed as a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is
PT
t=0 
t, the support of type distribution isW, and the welfare
weight for type w is g(w), and therefore, the arguments of Hellwig (2007) directly
apply. In particular, our claim follows from Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 of Hellwig
(2007). 
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